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RULE 10b-5 AND TRANSNATIONAL BANKRUPTCIES:
WHOSE LAW SHOULD APPLY?
LA UREN D. ROSENTHAL
INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of Rule lOb-5 fifty years ago, commercial activity
has extended beyond national boundaries, resulting in transnational cor-
porations with assets and business activities scattered throughout the
world. The disintegration of national commercial borders,' and the
global securities market2 which has consequently emerged, could not
have been fully anticipated when the Securities Exchange Commission
drafted this provision. Accordingly, globalization has raised questions
concerning the extraterritorial application of Rule lOb-5. This issue has
been the subject of frequent litigation, as well as the focal point of intense
scholarly debate. Although these questions have yet to be resolved fully
and satisfactorily, the courts adjudicating these issues have established
general guidelines toward this goal.
To complicate this issue further, however, many of these transnational
corporations have undergone bankruptcy proceedings in recent years.
This occurrence has, in turn, raised questions concerning the extraterri-
torial application of United States bankruptcy laws. Once again, the
courts have developed flexible and malleable guidelines to address this
issue. Yet, as this Note will show, the guidelines addressing transna-
tional bankruptcies conflict with those addressing transnational securities
fraud. This conflict presents yet another challenge to the courts in cir-
cumstances where transnational bankrupt companies are accused of Rule
lOb-5 violations. This Note discusses the challenge that the courts face,
in attempting to reconcile this conflict.
At the outset, an understanding of this globalization process is helpful.
A combination of factors is responsible for this surge of international
activity.3 Technological advances in computer and telecommunication
1. See David L. Goelzer & Anne Sullivan, Obtaining Evidence for the International
Enforcement of the United States Securities Laws, 16 Brook. J. Int'l L. 145 (1990). "In
the world market the average investor, both in the United States and abroad, is increas-
ingly likely to own an interest in business entities outside his or her own country ....
Id. at 145; see also Foreign Investment in U.S. Exceeds American Investment Abroad Last
Year, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1638 (Nov. 3, 1989) [hereinafter Foreign
Investment in U.S.] (In 1988, "foreign direct investment [defined as at least 10% owner-
ship of a United States asset] in the United States totaled S328.9 billion" and Americans
invested $326.9 billion overseas.).
2. See Goelzer & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 145 (citing Terry M. Chuppe et al., The
Securities Market in the 1980's: A Global Perspective (1989)). "The internationalization
of the world's securities markets has become a fact: capital investments worldwide have
increased threefold this decade, while world stock market capitalization rose from 2.5
trillion dollars in 1980 to 8.2 trillion dollars in 1988." Id.
3. See infra notes 4-14 and accompanying text. Although these factors have accom-
panied the emergence of the international securities market, it is difficult to ascertain
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systems provide businesses with around-the-clock access to foreign mar-
kets.4 This access has facilitated the mobility5 and liquidity of invest-
ments, thus reducing risks to investors. Increased mobility and liquidity
has encouraged investors to pursue investment opportunities without re-
gard to national boundaries.6 For example, increased access to foreign
investors has facilitated the recent privatization of major industries in
several countries.7 Equity offerings, too large to be satisfied by national
markets alone, can now be sold in multinational markets.
Political changes and shifting economic strategies have significantly af-
fected investment decisions. For example, the recent fall of communism
in the former Soviet Union has led to an influx of foreign investments in
the untapped markets of several countries.' Similarly, German reunifica-
tion has-been met with equally receptive and eager investors.9 In fact,
"the process of deregulation ... has facilitated market access and at-
tracted new investors"10 in many of the advanced economies. Another
phenomenon that attracted foreign investors in the 1980s was the in-
creased demand for funds in the United States resulting from an abun-
dance of corporate mergers and acquisitions."
Investors utilize international portfolio management as an insurance
policy to reduce exposure to depressed local market conditions and to
stabilize volatile exchange rates, interest rates, and equity prices.12 This
strategy has been used more frequently as investors have become more
familiar with non-domestic issuers.
Finally, innovative financial instruments have been designed to "sim-
plify" investment and attract new investors. 3 For example, the Eurodol-
lar and Eurobond markets were created in response to United States
taxpayers' needs. 14
The preceding factors have contributed toward the emerging global
whether they have been the catalyst of this internationalization process, a result of this
process, or both. See Michael Gruson, The Global Securities Market: Introductory Re-
marks, 1987 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 303, 304.
4. See Gruson, supra note 3, at 305-06.
5. See Goelzer & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 145.
6. See Gruson, supra note 3, at 304.
7. See id. at n.3 (discussing the public offering of British Telecom Airways). Mul-
timarket offerings are more complex than cross-border issues targeted at a single market.
See id. Furthermore, issuers from relatively small capital markets, such as Scandinavian
companies, rely on overseas markets to fulfill their needs. See id.
8. See Stuart Auerbach, Helping U.S. Businesses Move into Former Soviet Bloc,
Wash. Post, Apr. 23, 1992, at A21.
9. See id.
10. Gruson, supra note 3, at 305. One example of such deregulation is London's "Big
Bang," which resulted in new opportunities for international investment. See id. at 305
n.4.
11. See Foreign Investment in U.S., supra note 1, at 1639.
12. See Gruson, supra note 3, at 305.
13. See id. at 304. Conceivably, however, such product development could compli-
cate, rather than simplify financial investment.
14. See id. at 305.
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securities market. Because this evolution has not been accompanied by
uniform regulatory structures, however, globalization has enabled Amer-
ican investors to avoid United States regulations by permitting trading
beyond its borders."5 This opportunity has been especially enticing to
United States investors because United States securities laws are more
stringent than comparable laws of other countries.16
Thus, in order to maintain control over trading activity that is deemed
illegal according to United States standards, international application of
United States securities laws is essential. To this end, United States
courts have permitted an expansive application of its securities laws.
The new integrated market will likely result in a large number of bank-
ruptcies as a result of both risky experimentation and interdependence of
markets worldwide.17 However, traditional domestic safety nets, estab-
lished to prevent a bankruptcy from causing a national disaster, are not
available once transactions move across national borders. Therefore, as
investors continue to pursue international investment opportunities,
transnational bankruptcies will become more commonplace. Because
courts continue to permit an expansive application of United States se-
curities laws, Rule lOb-5 claims will inevitably arise in the context of
these transnational bankruptcies. Yet, there are no uniform regulations
guiding international insolvency proceedings."8
In 1978, Congress enacted section 304 of the Bankruptcy Act to deal
with transnational bankruptcies. This provision encourages United
States courts to defer to foreign law in appropriate situations and
presumes that foreign insolvency proceedings are fair.19 This is in con-
flict with the approach taken by the courts in international securities
cases.
20
This Note discusses Rule lOb-5 claims that are brought within the con-
text of an international bankruptcy. Part I describes the broad extrater-
ritorial application of United States securities laws in Rule lOb-5 cases.
Part I also compares and contrasts extraterritorial application in Rule
lOb-5 cases with the more limited extraterritorial application of United
States bankruptcy laws. Part II discusses the importance of the extrater-
ritorial doctrine in an integrated global market in which conflicting regu-
lations exist. Part III addresses the conflict that arises when securities
claims are brought within the context of a transnational bankruptcy.
This Note concludes that strong United States public policy against se-
curities fraud mandates that the more expansive extraterritorial ap-
proach generally applied in Rule lOb-5 actions be followed in situations
15. See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
17. See infra part II.
18. See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 108-27 and accompanying text.
20. See infra part I and accompanying text.
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where the securities claim arises in the context of a transnational bank-
ruptcy proceeding.
I. EXTRATERRITORIAL DOCTRINE
A. Rule lOb-5
Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act"),2'%
the United States imposed a centralized regulatory system on secondary
trading of public securities.22 This regulation requires corporate securi-
ties issuers to disclose certain information to investors.23 The Securities
and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") is charged with enforcing these
disclosure laws, and has done so primarily through the implementation
of rules.24
Rule lOb-5, promulgated under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, was es-
tablished to eliminate securities fraud. It prohibits:
any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.25
Under Rule lOb-5, courts have defined an insider trading offense as
follows:
(1) a nondisclosure
(2) of material, nonpublic information;
(3) made with scienter...
(4) in breach of a fiduciary duty.26
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
22. See id.
23. See Rasmussen, An Overview of Insider Trading Laws in the United States, 9 Int'l
Bus. Law. 389, 389 (1981).
24. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
26. Ronald E. Bornstein & N. Elaine Dugger, International Regulation of Insider
Trading, 2 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 375, 380-81 (1987) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980) (holding that the SEC is required to prove scienter in an
action to enjoin violations of antifraud provisions); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 230 (1980) (holding that liability under § 10(b) requires a finding of duty to dis-
close); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 & n.12 (1976) (barring an action
under § 10(b) in the absence of an allegation of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud);
Harkavy v. Apparel Indus., Inc., 571 F.2d 737, 741 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978) (discussing materi-
ality); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18 (2d Cir. 1977) (same); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (equating nondisclosure with fraudulent
misrepresentation for purposes of committing securities fraud).
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Because securities markets have become international, the SEC fre-
quently needs to obtain "evidence from, or [assert] jurisdiction over, per-
sons located outside the United States" in order to enforce Rule lOb-5
regulations.2' As a result, federal courts have become concerned with
the application of United States securities laws in cases involving foreign
activity with an American nexus.2 8 While many commentators question
whether the SEC can assert jurisdiction in transnational cases, a related
and more critical issue is which country's laws should be applied once
jurisdiction is asserted. 9 This latter issue will often determine the ulti-
mate result of a Rule lOb-5 case because the United States securities
laws, which have "developed almost entirely out of the general anti-fraud
provisions of federal statutes,"30 are unique as compared to the laws of
other nations. This choice-of-law determination becomes problematic
when dealing with multinational investors and markets.
Another problem is that United States securities laws are silent as to
their extraterritorial reach. In fact, United States courts have found little
guidance in either the language31 or legislative history 2 of the 1934 Act.
27. Goelzer & Sullivan, supra note I, at 146.
28. This concern applies equally to all potential permutations, including transactions
in which the following occur: (1) a foreigner trades United States securities, (2) a United
States citizen trades foreign securities, and (3) a United States citizen trades United States
securities from abroad. For a comprehensive discussion of cases discussing the extraterri-
torial reach of Rule lOb-5, see generally James J. Finnerty, Note, The 'Mother Court'and
the Foreign Plaintiff. Does Rule 10b-5 Reach Far Enough?, in Annual Survey of Finan-
cial Institutions and Regulation, Happy Birthday lOb-5: Fifty Years of Antifraud Regu-
lations, 61 Fordham L. Rev. S287 (1993) (arguing for a limited extension of Rule lOb-5
across international borders).
29. The cases considering the extraterritorial application of Rule lOb-5 often blur the
distinction between jurisdiction and choice of law to be applied. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Insider Trading Regulation § 14.03, at 14-9 (1989). These cases presume
that when a United States court is deemed to have jurisdiction over a particular matter,
that court will apply United States securities laws to the dispute. In theory, however,
these are two separate, though related, issues. As such, a United States court could, in
appropriate circumstances, choose to apply foreign securities laws, rather than United
States securities laws. But see id (asserting that some recent cases have addressed this
distinction and, consequently, have refused to apply "American law even where the
threshold tests are met").
30. Bornstein & Dugger, supra note 26, at 379.
31. Actually, § 30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b)
(1988), purports to impose limitations on the application of the provisions of that Act. It
states as follows:
The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not
apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the
jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.
Id (emphasis added). However, the phrase "without the jurisdiction of the United
States" has been a source of controversy among the courts. Most courts have initially
read "jurisdiction" in the territorial sense, thereby limiting the rule's applicability to all
persons transacting business in securities inside the territory of the United States. In
recent years, however, courts have expanded the meaning of "jurisdiction" to include
prescriptive jurisdiction-i.e., jurisdiction extending far beyond the territory of the
United States. See Comment, The Transnational Reach ofRule lOb-5, 121 U. Pa. L Rev.
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In addition, while the SEC and Congress have attempted to clarify the
extent to which specific sections of the securities laws apply in transna-
tional settings,33 they have not set limits on the extraterritorial reach of
Rule lOb-5. a4
Given the lack of established guidelines for controlling application in
the international context, courts have been forced to look elsewhere for
guidance. United States courts have relied upon principles of interna-
tional law and have commonly referred to the Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (the "Restatement (Sec-
ond)")35 to justify and support their conclusions.3 6 Pursuant to the
guidelines set forth in the Restatement (Second), United States courts
have developed several broad tests for determining the extraterritorial
reach of Rule lOb-5.
The first of these tests-the "conduct" test--entitles a state to pre-
scribe rules governing conduct within its own territory.37 The Second
1363, 1390-91 (1973). This expansion has been in response to increasing transnational
transactions. See infra Part II.
32. "The legislative history indicates little more about § 10(b) of the Act than that it
was intended as an antifraud catchall." Note, American Adjudication of Transnational
Securities Fraud, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 553 n.4 (1976) [hereinafter American Adjudica-
tion] (citing Hearings on Stock Exchange Regulation Before the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934)). According to Judge
Robert Bork, "'[i]f the text of the 1934 Act is relatively barren, even more so is the
legislative history.'" Margaret V. Sachs, The International Reach of Rule lOb-5: The
Myth of Congressional Silence, 28 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 677, 687 (1990) (quoting
Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
33. For a brief outline of areas in which the SEC has addressed the transnational
applicability of the securities laws, see Comment, supra note 31, at 1364 & n.2.
34. See American Adjudication, supra note 32, at 553 n.7 (asserting that the SEC has
generally prosecuted in cases of transnational securities fraud, thereby expanding judicial
interpretation of the rule).
35. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965) [here-
inafter Restatement (Second)].
36. See, e.g., SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 113 n.12 (3d Cir. 1977) (relying upon
Judge Weis' interpretation of § 17(a) of the Restatement (Second) in concluding that
conduct in this country, standing alone, is enough for jurisdiction to attach under the
federal securities laws); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir.)
("We have no doubt that the activities within the United States, detailed in the judge's
thorough factual findings, were sufficient to authorize the United States to impose a rule
with respect to consequences flowing from them wherever they might appear, under the
principle stated in Restatement (2d) ... § 17. .. ."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975);
IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Although the United States
has power to prescribe the conduct of its nationals everywhere in the world, see Restate-
ment (2d) ... Congress does not often do so and courts are forced to interpret the statute
at issue in the particular case."); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468
F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972) ("The instant case deals... with the problem considered
in the Restatement[ ] [(Second)'s] § 17, 'Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Con-
duct, Thing, Status, or other Interest within Territory.' ").
37. See Restatement (Second), supra note 35, §§ 10(a), 17(a); see also IIT v. Cornfeld,
619 F.2d 909, 932 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that, absent specific effects on American
exchanges or American investors, substantial fraudulent conduct must occur in the
United States for a United States court to assert jurisdiction over a predominantly foreign
securities fraud claim); Bersch, 519 F.2d at 992 ("While merely preparatory activities in
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Circuit established this test in Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. V.
Maxwell,38 which concerned a foreign defendant who allegedly made
"substantial misrepresentations" in order to defraud an American corpo-
ration. The court held that misrepresentations made in the United States
constituted sufficient conduct within its territory, even though it was un-
derstood at the outset that the remainder of activities would transpire
abroad.39 Thus, the court found that United States securities laws
applied.
A second test, of far greater scope' ° than the "conduct" test, is the
"effects" test. This test provides that the United States may regulate con-
duct which occurs outside its territory if that conduct produces a sub-
stantial and foreseeable effect within its territory.'" In devising this test,
the Second Circuit gave an expansive interpretation of section 18 of the
Restatement (Second). The court stated that violations of the 1934 Act
are within the subject matter jurisdiction of United States courts regard-
less of where the violations occur, "at least when the transactions involve
stock registered and listed on a national securities exchange, and are det-
rimental to the interests of American investors."'4
A third test for determining the reach of Rule 10b-5 is based upon the
nationality principle, which provides that a state has jurisdiction over the
conduct of its citizens regardless of whether that conduct occurs outside
its boundaries. 43 Members of the international community have univer-
sally accepted this principle, although the extent to which they have ap-
plied it has varied widely." In contrast, United States courts have
generally disfavored this approach.45
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
the United States are not enough to trigger application of the securities laws for injury to
foreigners located abroad, they are sufficient when the injury is to Americans so resi-
dent."); Vencap Ltd, 519 F.2d at 1018 (holding that federal district court could exercise
jurisdiction over Bahamian corporation alleged to have defrauded Luxembourg invest-
ment trust where "the acts that consummated the fraud" occurred within the United
States); Maxwell, 468 F.2d at 1336 ("Congress ... meant § 10(b) to protect against fraud
in the sale or purchase of securities whether or not these were traded on organized United
States markets. . . ."). Moreover, the Act is applicable to transactions in foreign securi-
ties occurring outside the United States when "substantial misrepresentations were made
in the United States." Id. at 1337.
38. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
39. See id. at 1337.
40. See American Adjudication, supra note 32, at 556.
41. See Restatement (Second), supra note 35, § 18. The Second Circuit devised the
"effects" test in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part and
remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). The court consequently asserted juris-
diction despite the fact that the alleged conduct occurred outside the United States and
involved foreign investors. See id at 208.
42. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208.
43. See Restatement (Second), supra note 35, § 30.
44. See Comment, supra note 31, at 1368 n.24 (citing Research in International Law:
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 435, 445, 519-35 (Supp. 1935)).
45. See Daniel L. Goelzer et al., The Draft Revised Restatement: A Critique From a
Securities Regulation Perspective, 19 Int'l Law. 431, 443 (1985).
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(the "Restatement (Third)")46 proposes still another analytical approach
to determine the choice of law question. Section 416 of the Restatement
(Third) identifies five specific situations in which the application of
United States securities laws is presumed reasonable.47 Additionally, it
specifies factors by which to determine the reasonableness of United
States securities laws in other circumstances. 4  At least one commenta-
tor has labeled this approach the "reasonableness test."' 49 Courts and
commentators, however, have asserted that this approach is
counterproductive.5 0
46. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987).
47. The Restatement (Third) reads, in pertinent part as follows:
(1) The United States may generally exercise jurisdiction to prescribe with re-
spect to
(a) (i) any transaction in securities carried out in the United States to which
a national or resident of the United States is a party, or
(ii) any offer to enter into a securities transaction, made in the United
States by or to a national or resident of the United States;
(b) any transaction in securities
(i) carried out, or intended to be carried out, on an organized securities
market in the United States, or
(ii) carried out, or intended to be carried out, predominantly in the
United States, although not on an organized securities market;
(c) conduct, regardless of where it occurs, significantly related to a transac-
tion described in Subsection (1)(b), if the conduct has, or is intended to
have, a substantial effect in the United States;
(d) conduct occurring predominantly in the United States that is related to a
transaction in securities, even if the transaction takes place outside the
United States; or
(e) investment advice or solicitation of proxies or of consents with respect to
securities, carried out predominantly in the United States.
Id. § 416(l).
48. The Restatement (Third) § 416(2) specifies the following factors:
(2) Whether the United States may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe with re-
spect to transactions or conduct other than those addressed in Subsection (1)
depends on whether such exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable in the light of
§ 403, in particular
(a) whether the transaction or conduct has, or can reasonably be expected to
have, a substantial effect on a securities market in the United States for secur-
ities of the same issuer or on holdings in such securities by United States
nationals or residents;
(b) whether representations are made or negotiations are conducted in the
United States;
(c) whether the party sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of the United
States is a United States national or resident, or the persons sought to be
protected are United States nationals or residents.
Id. § 416(2).
49. Sachs, supra note 32, at 684.
50. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(criticizing balancing test set forth in Restatement (Second) § 403(2)); Goelzer et a.,
supra note 45, at 450 (asserting that this approach "would require a more detailed analy-
sis and a greater expenditure of judicial resources than under current law or under the
Code"); David Michaels, Note, Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Transnational Securities
Fraud: A Suggested Roadmap to the New Standard of Reasonableness, 71 Cornell L. Rev.
919, 930-31 (1986) (suggesting that this approach is not judicially manageable).
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Although the approaches set forth in the Restatements provide guide-
lines for Congress in promulgating securities regulations, technically,
Congress is constrained only by the Constitution. In fact, Congress may
extend application beyond the principles of international law, provided
that such extension comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.51 Thus, in interpreting these statutes and in applying them
to transnational disputes, courts have a duty to comply with congres-
sional intent. Such compliance has been problematic, however, because
the 1934 Act, like many other federal statutes, is silent on the issue of
extraterritoriality. 2 As an alternative, United States courts have applied
the guidelines set forth in the Restatement (Second) as an outer limit on
extraterritorial application of securities laws.53 Relying on these guide-
lines, courts have continually expanded the reach of Rule lOb-5.
Because the Restatement (Second) is subject to varying interpretations,
judges have wide discretion in determining the international reach of
Rule lOb-5. Yet, courts have found it difficult to conform their interpre-
tations to one of the existing tests for extraterritorial reach. For example,
they have struggled to define "conduct" under the "conduct" test. Fur-
ther, their efforts to determine whether an "effect" is "substantial and
foreseeable" under the "effects" test have been, for the most part, fruit-
less. 4 In explaining its decision to apply the "effects" test in
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,5 the court stated, "[w]e believe that Congress
intended the [1934 Act] to have extraterritorial application in order to
protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on
American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from
51. See eg., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334
(2d Cir. 1972):
It is true, as Judge L[earned] Hand pointed out in [United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)], that if Congress has expressly
prescribed a rule with respect to conduct outside the United States, even one
going beyond the scope recognized by foreign relations law, a United States
court would be bound to follow the Congressional direction unless this would
violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
See also American Adjudication, supra note 32, at 554 ("Congress may extend jurisdiction
beyond the [Restatement (Second)'s] scope to the extent consistent with due process.");
Comment, supra note 31, at 1369 ("Congress... may choose to exceed the limits im-
posed on its prescriptive jurisdiction and thereby violate international law.... From the
viewpoint of the United States courts, then, the only limits upon congressional power to
prescribe rules of law are those imposed by the Constitution.") (citations omitted).
52. For examples of cases that have applied the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity in cases concerning statutes that are silent on the issue, see Sachs, supra note 32, at
684 n.26.
53. See American Adjudication, supra note 32, at 554-55; see also Comment, supra
note 31, at 1370 C" '[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains."' (quoting Murray v. Schooner
"Charming Betsy," 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804))).
54. See American Adjudication, supra note 32, at 556-57.
55. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part and remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc).
1993] S329
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW[o
the effects of improper foreign transactions ... 56 Yet, "[s]ince most
publicly-owned companies are likely to have some American sharehold-
ers, an expansive interpretation of Schoenbaum would bring securities
transactions throughout the world within the ambit of Rule l0b-5.2"5
Recognizing this problem, Judge Friendly attempted to limit the scope of
Rule 10b-5 in Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell,58 by in-
corporating restrictions into the dicta of his opinions.59 Although he
continued this practice in subsequent opinions, his attempts were virtu-
ally fruitless because he continually asserted subject matter jurisdiction.6°
In fact, the United States courts have been overwhelmingly receptive to-
ward plaintiffs claiming lOb-5 violations and have continued to extend its
application across international borders with increasing frequency. 61 On
the other hand, United States courts have been more reluctant to extend
application of other United States laws to extraterritorial disputes.62
B. United States Bankruptcy Laws
There is currently no consistent or reliable procedure for resolving dis-
putes between debtors and creditors who are from different nations.63
Many commentators have argued that the most effective solution would
be an international bankruptcy treaty. These commentators, however,
generally concede that, judging from past attempts, negotiating such a
treaty would prove frustrating and inconclusive. 4 This path to interna-
tional bankruptcy cooperation is obstructed by the varying customs and
56. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206.
57. American Adjudication, supra note 32, at 556-57.
58. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
59. See id. at 1334. He stated, "[T]he language of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act is much too inconclusive to lead us to believe that Congress meant to impose rules
governing conduct throughout the world in every instance where an American company
bought or sold a security." Id. He further stated: "[lit would be ... erroneous to as-
sume that the legislature always means to go to the full extent permitted. This is a ques-
tion of the interpretation of the particular statute .... ." Id.
60. See American Adjudication, supra note 32, at 557 (citing Bersch v. Drexel Fire-
stone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975), and IIT v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975), as examples of cases where the Second Circuit at-
tempted "to restrict the scope of Schoenbaum's effects test," yet, ultimately asserted sub-
ject matter jurisdiction).
61. See, e-g., Sachs, supra note 32, at 679 n.10 (citing cases allowing foreign traders to
sue under Rule lOb-5).
62. See infra part I. B.
63. See Stacy A. Morales & Barbara A. Deutsch, Bankruptcy Code Section 304 and
U.S. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: The Tyranny of Comity, 39 Bus. Law. 1573,
1573 (1984).
64. See id. at 1573 & n. 1 (listing the French-Swiss Treaty of 1869, the French-Belgian
Treaty of 1899, the Belgian-Netherlands Treaty of 1925, the Italian-French Treaty of
1930, and the France-Monaco Treaty of 1950, as Full Faith and Credit treaties that un-
successfully dealt with bankruptcy); see also Richard A. Gitlin & Evan D. Flaschen, The
International Void in the Law of Multinational Bankruptcies, 42 Bus. Law. 307, 309-10
(1987) (emphasizing difficulties encountered in reaching multinational treaties to deal
with bankruptcy).
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policies followed by each country, which are reflected in their differing
attitudes toward bankruptcy.6" For example, some countries encourage
"rehabilitation of the debtor,"66 while others support liquidation of the
debtor's property.67 Moreover, some countries, such as Brazil, only rec-
ognize a limited number of entities as eligible for bankruptcy,68 while
other countries, such as the United States, recognize "the vast majority
of persons and entities [as] eligible for bankruptcy proceedings."'69
These conflicting approaches are summed up in two doctrines: the ter-
ritoriality theory and the universality theory. ° Under the territoriality
doctrine, separate bankruptcy proceedings take place concurrently in the
jurisdiction where the debtor is located and in the jurisdiction or jurisdic-
tions where the debtor's assets are located.' 1 Extraterritorial recognition
is not given to either proceeding.72 In contrast, under the universality
doctrine, there is only one bankruptcy adjudication. This proceeding
takes place in the jurisdiction of the debtor's domicile, even when assets
throughout the world are included in the estate, and the court's judgment
is recognized everywhere.73 Although the universality approach requires
creditors to submit to foreign laws, thereby subjecting them to inconven-
ience, its underlying premise is that creditors in similar positions will
receive equal treatment.74
At first glance, the universality approach appears to be ideal. Realisti-
cally, however, this approach is meaningless unless all countries agree to
enforce the judgments of other jurisdictions. Such an agreement would
require the existence of a treaty, and, as mentioned above, "treaties gov-
erning transnational bankruptcies are rare."" Thus, by default, the terri-
toriality approach has been applied by the majority of courts, thereby
resulting in multiple bankruptcy proceedings and conflicting national
65. See Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 64, at 308.
66. Id In the United States, for example, "'there is an express Congressional policy
in favor of rehabilitating debtors and maintaining the equity in their property.'" Id. at
308 n.4 (quoting In re Hollanger, 15 B.R. 35, 48 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1981)).
67. See icL at 308. In countries that favor liquidation, reorganization is very rare.
Less than one percent of West German debtors have been able to successfully reorganize
and approximately only 10 debtors in the past two decades have been able to do so in
Mexico. See id. at 308 n.5.
68. See id at 308 (citing Timothy E. Powers & Rona R. Mears, Protecting a U.S.
Debtor's Assets in International Bankruptcy: A Survey and Proposal for Reciprocity, 10
N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 303, 309-10 (1985)).
69. Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 64, at 308 (referring to 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1982)).
70. See Barbara K. Unger, United States Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies, 19 Int'l
Law. 1153, 1154-55 (1985); see also Ulrich Huber, Creditor Equality in Transnational
Bankruptcies: the United States Position, 19 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 741, 744-46 (1986)
(comparing the benefits and disadvantages of the two doctrines).
71. See Huber, supra note 70, at 744.
72. See iL
73. See id
74. "Because every creditor's claim is subject to one body of law .... the universality
doctrine equalizes creditors' rights." Id
75. Id at 745.
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preferences.76
Historically, United States bankruptcy laws have been hostile toward
claims asserted by foreign trustees in bankruptcy against estate property
located in the United States." In fact, early in our history, the Supreme
Court established that "[t]he bankrupt law of a foreign country is incapa-
ble of operating a legal transfer of property in the United States."7" Ac-
cordingly, at least one commentator has accused the United States of
being one of the least cooperative of the major trading states when faced
with a foreign bankruptcy.79
The Bankruptcy Code of 1898 did not authorize foreign representa-
tives to initiate bankruptcy proceedings against United States debtors in
United States courts. In fact, prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, there was little statutory guidance regarding inter-
national bankruptcies.8 0 Therefore, until 1978, the courts based their de-
cisions upon the vague doctrine of comity, as proposed in the landmark
case of Hilton v. Guyot.s During this time period, "the foreign represen-
tative's only hope.., was for the court to recognize the representative's
claims as a matter of comity and then defer to the foreign administration
of the estate."82
The vague concept of comity is neither easily defined nor easily com-
prehended, but the Hilton Court attempted the following explanation:
"Comity," in the legal sense is neither a matter of absolute obligation,
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protections of its
laws.8 3
Under the concept of comity, courts are allowed, but not required, to
76. See John D. Honsberger, Conflict of Laws and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 30 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 631, 634-45 (1979-1980); see also Laker Airways v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that parallel
proceedings on the same in personam claim should ordinarily be allowed to proceed si-
multaneously, at least until one court reaches a decision).
77. See In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165, 167 (Bankr. E.D. Mich, 1983); see also
Unger, supra note 70, at 1153 ("The United States has traditionally not treated foreign
creditors favorably, especially when conflicting claims of United States creditors were
involved.").
78. Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289, 302 (1809).
79. See Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 64, at 314.
80. See Morales & Deutsch, supra note 63, at 1575-76.
81. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). Notably, Hilton was not a bankruptcy case. The Court
intended that the doctrine of comity be applied generally in the recognition of foreign
judgments. Consequently, this doctrine is not limited to bankruptcy issues.
82. Anne Norby Nielsen, Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code: Has it Fostered the
Development of an "International Bankruptcy System"?, 22 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 541,
546 (1984).
83. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64.
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recognize foreign laws, judgments, or proceedings. 4 The courts must
balance the interests of international responsibility and the protection of
local citizens on a case-by-case approach. Factors supporting recogni-
tion of foreign laws include "increased international cooperation through
reciprocal recognition, economic and efficient use of judicial resources,
and avoidance of multiple proceedings against the same debtor."' , Fac-
tors opposing recognition of foreign proceedings include "the desire to
protect local creditors, the inconvenience U.S. creditors would suffer in
being forced to assert their claims abroad, and differences in bankruptcy
laws which may violate basic principles of fairness according to U.S.
standards." 6 These factors, among others, must be weighed on a case-
by-case basis in order to determine whether foreign proceedings should
be recognized under the principles of comity.8 7
Initially, the post-Hilton cases relied upon comity as a license to adopt
a protectionist stance; the courts generally concluded that local citizens'
interests would be prejudiced and that public policy would be violated if
they were to recognize foreign proceedings." Nevertheless, an analysis
of more modem cases reveals a shift from this initial emphasis. Rather
than basing decisions upon "an overt nationalistic bias favoring Ameri-
can creditors," 9 the courts began to focus more on the equitable distri-
bution of assets among creditors." Yet, although comity was
84. See Unger, supra note 70, at 1159. This permission, of course, assumes that each
proceeding or judgment sought to be recognized is jurisdictionally proper. See id. at 1159
n.25 (citing Hilton, 159 U.S. at 166).
85. Id. at 1160.
86. Id.
87. See id. The court in Hilton ultimately denied recognition of a French judgment
by considering an additional requirement-reciprocity. The court expressly stated that
United States courts should not give full credit and conclusive effect to foreign judgments
rendered in countries which themselves refused to give conclusive effect to similar United
States judgments. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 227-28. This factor has been ignored, or criti-
cized, by virtually every court. It has been rejected by the courts of New York. See. eg.,
Cunard Steamship Co. v. Salen Reefer Services AB, 773 F.2d 452, 460 (2d Cir. 1985)
(quoting Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel
Corp., 300 F. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), aftd, 267 U.S. 22 (1925), which concluded that
the Supreme Court in Hilton "certainly did not mean to hold that an American court was
to recognize no obligations or duties arising elsewhere until it appeared that the sovereign
of the locus reciprocally recognized similar obligations existing here"). It has also been
rejected by other courts. See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp.,
453 F.2d 435, 440 n.8 (3d Cir. 1971) (acknowledging that "the doctrine [of reciprocity]
has received no more than desultory acknowledgment," and, further, that it has been
completely rejected by the New York courts), cerL denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). Simi-
larly, reciprocity has been rejected by statute in some states, such as California. See id. at
440 n.8 (citing Willis L.M. Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered
Abroad, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 783, 790-93 (1950)).
88. See, eg., Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570 (1908) (concluding that
the discretionary nature of comity entitles Wisconsin to favor its local creditors as a mat-
ter of public policy).
89. Morales & Deutsch, supra note 63, at 1579.
90. See Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 630 (2d Cir. 1976); see also
Somportex, 453 F.2d at 440 (concluding that "[c]omity should be withheld only when its
acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to
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consistently the principal basis for decisions during this time period, the
doctrine did not serve to render consistent decisions or adequate
protection. 91
The bankruptcy proceedings that arose from the 1974 failure of
Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt Kommanditgesellschagt auf Aktien ("Her-
statt"), a major West German commercial bank, clearly demonstrate the
inadequacy of United States law in the 1970s respecting foreign insol-
vency proceedings. 92 Although Herstatt did not conduct business in the
United States, it maintained over $150 million in assets at Chase Man-
hattan Bank of New York. Upon hearing of the bankruptcy, interna-
tional creditors from around the world "raced" to the courthouse to
attach the funds held by Chase,93 and those responding first reaped the
largest proportionate distributions.94 Moreover, the foreign representa-
tive appointed to liquidate the Herstatt estate chose not to participate in
the United States proceedings for fear of subjecting the entire estate to
United States jurisdiction.95 Eventually, the uncertainty created by the
complexity of the problems and the lengthy time period anticipated for
final determination motivated all of the parties to settle their claims out
of court.96 The disorder resulting from the Herstatt bankruptcy "high-
lighted the inability of American law to provide satisfactory guidance in
this international context." 97
The Second Circuit attempted to correct this inadequacy in two subse-
quent decisions: Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. v. FDIC"8 and Ban-
que de Financement v. First National Bank of Boston.9 9 In Israel-British
Bank, the representative of a foreign bankrupt debtor ("IBB")-a
London bank which conducted no business in the United States-sought
to recover assets held by New York correspondent banks. In contrast to
Herstatt, IBB chose to compete with United States creditors by partici-
pating in United States courts. Noting that "[t]he road to equity is not a
race course for the swiftest,"''  the court ordered the assets returned to
the London receiver so they could be equitably distributed pursuant to
the London proceeding.10' Significantly, the Second Circuit acknowl-
edged IBB's right to initiate a voluntary proceeding in the United States.
give it effect"), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Waxman v. Kealoha, 296 F. Supp.
1190, 1194 (D. Haw. 1969) (same).
91. See Morales & Deutsch, supra note 63, at 1574.
92. See Unger, supra note 70, at 1163-64; see also Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 64, at
314-15 (discussing the Herstatt affair).
93. See Unger, supra note 70, at 1164.
94. See Nielsen, supra note 82, at 548 (citing Joseph D. Becker, International Insol-
vency: The Case of Herstatt, 62 A.B.A. J. 1290, 1294 (1976)).
95. See Unger, supra note 70, at 1164.
96. See id. at 1165.
97. Id.
98. 536 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976).
99. 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977).
100. Israel-British Bank, 536 F.2d at 513.
101. See id. at 511-15.
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Further, it recognized this claim despite the potential for resulting harm
to United States creditors. 1
0 2
Similarly, in Banque de Financement v. First National Bank of Boston,
the Second Circuit stressed equal distribution among creditors in the in-
ternational context. 10 3 In this case, a Swiss bank undergoing reorganiza-
tion under Swiss Law initiated a parallel United States bankruptcy
proceeding to release its assets deposited in New York banks from at-
tachments by New York creditors. Both the bankruptcy and the trial
court held that United States creditors should be given preferential treat-
ment. The district court specifically focused on prejudice to American
creditors resulting from participation in Swiss bankruptcy procedures-
procedures which significantly differ from our own. In particular, the
court expressed concern over the Swiss bank secrecy laws.1° But, in
reversing the lower courts, the Second Circuit, relying upon Israel-British
Bank, interpreted the existing Bankruptcy Code"0 5 as being primarily
concerned with the equality of similarly situated creditors (regardless of
their nationality) and the economy of judicial resources."0 6
These two decisions marked a significant departure from the initial
protectionist interpretations of comity. In light of the Herstatt affair,
which so clearly demonstrated the inadequacies of our existing laws and
the consequent need for reformation, the decisions came as no surprise.
In fact, the judicial branch was not alone in its expression of dissatisfac-
tion; in 1970, Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States to amend and revise the old laws. In 1973, the Com-
mission proposed a draft of a new Bankruptcy Code which distinctly re-
flected the two Second Circuit decisions.'0 7
The Herstatt disaster, coupled with the inconsistent United States case
law regarding international insolvency, prompted Congress to enact sec-
tion 304 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the "Bankruptcy
102. See Morales & Deutsch, supra note 63, at 1580 (citing Israel-British Bank, 536
F.2d at 515).
103. 568 F.2d 911, 918 (2d Cir. 1977).
104. See id. at 921.
105. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 544, § 2a(22) (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ 1-1255), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
§ 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at I I U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. III
1991)).
106. See Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. v. Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 511
(2d Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976).
107. See Unger, supra note 70, at 1167.
In a note in the 1973 draft of the Code prepared by the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, it was stated that "recognition accorded
a foreign trustee... should enhance the likelihood that a trustee of an estate
appointed or elected in this country will be accorded respect when he sues to
recover property located abroad."
Id. at 1167 n.51 (alteration in original) (citing Bankruptcy Act Revisions Hearings on
H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomr. on Civil and Const. Rights of the House
Comm. of the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1443 (1976)).
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Act"). ' Section 304 and its related provisions 0 9 (hereinafter "section
304") provide a foreign representative" 0 with a number of protections
and opportunities that are similarly afforded to domestic creditors. Pur-
suant to section 304(a), a foreign representative has the option to file a
case ancillary to a foreign proceeding'II for the limited purpose of pursu-
ing certain specified remedies, without exposing himself to the jurisdic-
tion of any other United States court. 1 2 This provision addresses the
concerns of liquidators involved in Herstatt-like bankruptcies regarding
exposure to jurisdiction. Section 304(b) provides a foreign trustee with
two specific types of relief: first, the court may enjoin the commence-
ment, continuation, or enforcement of any United States action, judg-
ment, or lien against a debtor with respect to property or assets involved
in the foreign proceeding;" 3 second, the court may order that the prop-
erty in question be turned over to the representative for distribution in
the foreign proceeding." 4 Additionally, section 304(b) contains a flexible
catchall provision which empowers the court to order "other appropriate
relief" ' 5 under certain circumstances.
Section 304(c) enumerates specific factors which the bankruptcy
courts are required to consider in determining whether to grant the relief
requested by the foreign representative. The preamble of section 304(c)
clearly favors a universal approach to foreign bankruptcies, 116 demon-
strating Congress' intent to depart from pre-code treatment of foreign
bankruptcies and to shift focus away from biased protection of local in-
terests: "[i]n determining whether to grant relief ... the court shall be
guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious adminis-
tration of such estate."' " Furthermore, section 304(c) enumerates six
policy principles which a court should consider, and which, together,
conclusively manifest a congressional intent to expand upon and clarify
the prior law (which was governed solely by comity). These six factors
include the following:
108. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1988).
109. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(k), 305(b), and 306 (1988) (referring, in part or in whole, to
the foreign trustee).
110. A "foreign representative" is defined by the code as a "duly selected trustee, ad-
ministrator, or other representative of an estate in a foreign proceeding." II U.S.C.
§ 101(24) (Supp. III 1991).
111. "A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is commenced by the filing with the
bankruptcy court of a petition under this section by a foreign representative." 11 U.S.C.
§ 304(a) (1988).
112. "An appearance in a bankruptcy court by a foreign representative in connection
with a... request under section 303, 304, or 305 of this title does not submit such foreign
representative to the jurisdiction of any court in the United States for any other purpose."
11 U.S.C. § 306 (1988).
113. See 11 U.S.C. § 304(b)(1) (1988).
114. See id. § 304(b)(2) (1988).
115. Id. § 304(b)(3) (1988).
116. See Huber, supra note 70, at 746-48.
117. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1988).
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(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such
estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice
and inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign
proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of
such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance
with the order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for
the individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.'18
In order to alleviate the tensions between nationally-oriented and in-
ternationally-oriented policies, the drafters of the Bankruptcy Act ap-
plied a balancing approach. As a result, the Act embodies both the
universalist and territorialist theories of bankruptcy jurisdiction.1 9 In
addition, as evidenced by the legislative history, Congress did not intend
courts to be bound by these factors; rather, the factors should serve as
guidelines "designed to give the court maximum flexibility."' t20 Princi-
ples of international comity, including respect for the judgments and
laws of other nations, suggest that the court be permitted to make the
appropriate orders on a case-by-case basis, rather than being provided
with inflexible rules.
In addition to the six factors enumerated in the Bankruptcy Act, one
commentator has suggested other factors to consider when determining
whether to grant bankruptcy relief to a foreign representative, including
the following:
1) [whether] the failure to grant an order in an ancillary proceeding
will require a local bankruptcy to protect local assets, necessitating
concurrent bankruptcies and higher administrative costs;
2) [whether] the foreign bankruptcy law is similar to that of the
United States;
3) [whether] the relative ease of access to the foreign country and rela-
tive ease of communications with the foreign creditors facilitates a con-
venient proceeding;' 2 1 and
4) [whether] more creditors and a greater part of the estate of the
118. Id.
119. While some commentators have criticized § 304(c) for providing "a morass of
internally inconsistent and redundant principles" which have resulted in an unworkable
standard upon which to determine requests for relief, see Nielsen, supra note 82, at 554-
60, others have praised the flexibility these factors provide. See, e.g., Honsberger, supra
note 76, at 670 ("It is not the extent of the congressional action that is significant, but the
spirit implicit in its innovations."); Donald T. Trautman, Foreign Creditors in American
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 29 Harv. Int'l L.J. 49, 49 (1988) ("[The statutory additions of
1978 represent a significant statement by our legislature of a spirit of international coop-
eration in bankruptcy.").
120. Nielsen, supra note 82, at 543 & n.10 (citing S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
35 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5821).
121. "[O]n these grounds alone it would seem that all things being equal, a court's
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debtor are located in the foreign country.' 22
Following the enactment of section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code,
courts deciding transnational cases became more receptive to foreign
laws. For example, the bankruptcy court in In re Culmer 123 granted the
liquidators' petition to transfer all assets located in the United States to
the foreign court for distribution, holding that "[o]ne who invests in a
foreign corporation subjects his investment to foreign law and may not
seek to obtain greater rights than his co-creditors by suing in an Ameri-
can court."'
124
In addition, although more recent decisions still rely upon the doctrine
of comity, the meaning of the term "comity" has been turned virtually on
its head. Prior to the enactment of the Code, bankruptcy courts relied
upon comity to protect local interests and refused to defer to foreign pro-
ceedings whenever local interests were even slightly prejudiced. 121 Sub-
sequent to the enactment, many courts shifted their interpretation of
comity, holding that it generally requires courts to recognize foreign pro-
ceedings. 126 In fact, following the enactment of section 304, "New York
courts... narrowly construe[d] exceptions to the comity doctrine, stat-
ing that 'foreign-based rights should be enforced unless the judicial en-
forcement of such a [right] would be the approval of a transaction which
is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing
moral sense.' "127
II. THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL DOCTRINE
Part I of this Note explained the concept of the extraterritorial doc-
trine and explored its application to the substantive areas of securities
fraud and bankruptcy. This Section will expand upon that discussion,
discretion is more likely to be exercised in favor of a trustee from neighboring Canada
than one from Japan." Honsberger, supra note 76, at 656.
122. Id.
123. 25 B.R. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
124. Id. at 632; accord Cunard Steamship Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452
(2d Cir. 1985) (Second Circuit deferred to Swedish bankruptcy proceedings, vacating
English corporation's attachment of Swedish entity's assets located in the United States);
Kenner Prods. v. Societe Fonciere et Financiere Agache-Willot, 532 F. Supp. 478
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (New York court deferred to French bankruptcy proceeding); Cornfeld
v. Investors Overseas Servs., Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y.) (New York court de-
ferred to Canadian bankruptcy proceeding), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979). But see
In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (bankruptcy court held that
comity required claim of American lien creditor against Canadian debtor be litigated in
United States court, rather than permitting deferral to Canadian bankruptcy
proceedings).
125. See Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 64, at 314.
126. See Unger, supra note 70, at 1183.
127. Kenner Prods. v. Societe Fonciere et Financiere, 532 F. Supp. 478, 479 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (second alteration in original) (citing Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 203
N.E.2d 210, 212 (N.Y. 1924)).
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specifically addressing why concern about the application of the extrater-
ritorial doctrine intensifies as the global market evolves.
First, while an integrated global securities market undoubtedly pro-
vides substantial benefits to all parties involved,12 a number of problems
have ensued. Currently, "there is no cohesive supervision of the global
securities market[ ].,129 This fragmentation of supervision, both at na-
tional and agency levels, makes policing transnational securities transac-
tions difficult, if not impossible.130 Thus, as trading has expanded, the
ability of nations to detect, investigate, and prosecute violations of their
securities laws has become attenuated, and, consequently, the opportu-
nity for widespread abuse of these laws has multiplied dramatically.1 '
Second, United States securities laws are not only unique, 132 but are
also more inclusive and comprehensive in scope than comparable laws of
other countries.133 Accordingly, activity that the United States considers
illegal may be deemed permissible in other countries. Some American
nationals have exploited this by unlawfully trading American securities
through the use of foreign brokers and institutions. These investors usu-
ally trade "on the assumption that such trading activity will unlikely be
of interest to the foreign authorities and that much more difficult to de-
tect by American regulators."' 34 Moreover, they are further induced to
conduct illegal trading in foreign countries, such as the Bahamas, which
apply foreign secrecy and blocking laws to maintain their confidential-
ity.135 For example, Dennis Levine, a United States citizen convicted of
securities fraud, utilized bank accounts established in the Bahamas to
conduct illegal trading.' 36
128. See Gruson, supra note 3, at 306.
129. Id. at 307.
130. See Bornstein & Dugger, supra note 26, at 376.
131. See House Committee Report Critical of SEC's International Enforcement, 20 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1551 (Oct. 14, 1988) [hereinafter House Committee Report] ("The
report... found that of 229 market surveillance reports containing suspicious foreign
trades that were reported to the SEC during 1986 and 1987, the commission failed to
pursue the foreign trades in 168-73 percent.").
132. See generally Elyse Diamond, Note, Outside Investors" A New Breed of Insider
Traders, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Fi-
nancial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S319 (1992) (comparing key aspects of
United States securities regulations with their foreign counterparts).
133. See id, at S338; see also Andrew N. Grass Jr., Internationalization of the Securities
Trading Markets, 9 Houston J. Int'l L. 17, 49 (1986) (concluding that the scope of insider
trading is far more developed in the United States than in foreign securities markets).
134. Langevoort, supra note 29, § 14.01.
135. For example, the Cayman Islands responded to a flood of subpoenas served on
American tax dodgers by the Internal Revenue Service by enacting the Confidential Rela-
tionships Preservation Law. This made it a crime for banks or local officials to disclose
information to "nosy. foreign governments" or investigators. Steve Lohr, Where the
Money Washes Up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 27, 46; see also House
Committee Report, supra note 131, at 1551 ("rThe Securities and Exchange Commission
has not enforced vigorously U.S. securities laws against suspicious trades originating
from ... countries with bank secrecy and 'blocking' statutes.").
136. See Langevoort, supra note 29, § 14.01; see also Wall Street Rogues Where are
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Third, problems may arise even when neither of the two parties in-
volved in the trade deliberately seek to evade stringent laws. This occurs
because different laws will likely govern a transaction across interna-
tional borders; hence, neither party can be certain of the legality of the
transaction. 137
Fourth, the regulation of international trade is further complicated by
the electronic linkages among exchanges worldwide. In addition to the
linkages established by the marketplaces themselves, a number of private
systems now provide parties with the capability to trade by computer. 138
These linkages/systems permit transactions to be electronically routed
through several exchanges before settling at its final destination, making
the origin of the transaction difficult to trace. 39 Also, authorities have
they Now?, USA Today, Nov. 23, 1990, at 3B (discussing some key players involved in
the Wall Street scandals of the 1980s); Lohr, supra note 135, at 28:
Brian M. Bruh, director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, a 200-
person unit in the United States Treasury Department, recalls that not long ago
a fraud investigation was a local affair. "Now a typical fraud case is not only
nationwide but worldwide. And the offshore centers are frequently used by the
crooks."
137. See Richard P. Bernard, International Linkages Between Securities Markets: "A
Ring of Dinosaurs Joining Hands And Dancing Together"?, 1987 Colum. Bus. L. Rev.
321, 328-36.
138. See Grass, supra note 133, at 40. For example, Instinet, which was developed by
the Reuters Monitor System, provides an electronic marketplace for traders. "These and
other technological advances have been seized upon by global markets .... Freely oper-
ating securities markets will be created, which may not conform to perceptions held in
the United States of firm and orderly markets, but which will decidedly have direct im-
pacts on U.S. markets .... " Id.
For a more extensive discussion on the computerization of trading systems, see Law-
rence D. McCabe, Note, Puppet Masters or Marionettes: Is Program Trading Manipula-
tive Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934?, in Annual Survey of Financial
Institutions and Regulation, Happy Birthday lOb-5: Fifty Years of Antifraud Regula-
tion, 61 Fordham L. Rev. S207 (arguing that computerized program trading arguably
falls within the definition of "manipulative" as defined by the 1934 Act).
139. See Lohr, supra note 135.
In their efforts to monitor the global movement of funds through money
havens, the United States has signed tax-information exchange agreements with
several offshore countries and territories in the Caribbean, including Barbados,
Jamaica, Bermuda and Grenada. In exchange for their cooperation, Washing-
ton has said it will encourage American investment in those places.
Id. at 52. "However,. .. 'the key secrecy jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands and the
Bahamas refused to lift the veil.'" Id. (quoting Bruce Zagaris, a Washington lawyer who
is an expert on international criminal law).
The difficulty of tracing funds routed through foreign banks presents problems in in-
vestigating many crimes. See, eg., Sara Fritz & Robert C. Jackson, Federal Authorities
Expect Additional Arrests in Trade Center Bombing, L.A. Times, Mar. 13, 1993, at A16
(criticizing the laissez-faire attitude of German authorities toward policing terrorist
abuses of banks: "'The Germans are very remiss on policing the corporations and banks
and their misuse by terrorist groups' ..... 'On several incidents over the years, the trails
go through Germany.' "); Jim McGee, Authorities Trace Source of Bomb Suspects'
Money, Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1993, at Al (quoting the New York Police Commissioner
Raymond W. Kelly regarding the difficulty of discerning financial transactions and locat-
ing the source of funds when such funds have been routed through several locations).
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lost a substantial amount of control over trading because of these link-
ages/systems. For example, the SEC has complained that the effective-
ness of an order to halt trading in one jurisdiction may be impaired if
trading in the same securities is possible in a different jurisdiction
through another exchange.140
In sum, although progress has stimulated a global economy, similar
accomplishments have not yet been made toward its regulation. This
inability to regulate the growing number of international transactions has
caused a loss of control over the securities markets. Furthermore, when
certain cross-border transactions are deemed beyond the reach of the
United States legal system and are governed, instead, by less stringent
foreign laws, the integrity of the United States securities market is under-
mined. Thus, the extraterritorial doctrine is of great concern in the
evolving global market.'
4 1
A much more serious concern than that of impracticable supervision,
however, is the devastating effect that one failure in this unified global
market could have on the entire system.' 42 In other words, because of
the interdependence between members of a global market, such a failure
could cause a domino-theory collapse that might have global impacts.
To this end, a minor domestic bankruptcy could be transformed into a
world-wide catastrophe. This threat of collapse is exacerbated in a global
market, as opposed to a national market, because international investors
are more likely to overextend themselves in risky transactions and, con-
sequently, to become bankrupt. Moreover, these risks are magnified in
global transactions because volatile exchange rates, which are often uti-
lized to diversify risk, 143 simultaneously create a potential for loss,'" and
international players do not have access to government help in the event
that this loss is realized.14
In contrast, our national system has designed "safety nets" upon
which domestic players'" may rely in certain emergencies. For example,
where a lack of financing may result in far-reaching repercussions, cen-
tral banks can step in as lenders of last resort in order to prevent a na-
tional disaster.'4 Furthermore, the United States Bankruptcy Code
140. See Bornstein & Dugger, supra note 26, at 376.
141. See Kenneth W. Dam, Economic and Political Aspects of Extraterritoriality, 19
Int'l Law. 887, 888 (1985); see also Finnerty, supra note 28, at pt. II (arguing for a limited
extension of extraterritorial application of Rule 10b-5).
142. See Gruson, supra note 3, at 307-08.
143. See id at 305.
144. See Bernard, supra note 137, at 326. In addition, these fluctuations create a risk
of non-performance when they occur during the period between the trade and the settle-
ment. See id
145. See id While commercial banks may be protected to some extent, investment
banks in international markets do not have any such cushion. See Gruson, supra note 3,
at 308.
146. Once financial players cross international borders, however, they may no longer
rely upon this protection.
147. See Gruson, supra note 3, at 308.
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includes provisions designed to alleviate the confusion resulting from a
domestic crisis. Specifically, section 365148 addresses the issue of execu-
tory contracts and what happens if a party to a transaction becomes
bankrupt during the settlement period. 149 Still another domestic safety
net, which is of no avail once transactions move across international bor-
ders, includes the accessibility of clearing corporations and depositories
which protect creditors from the nonperformance of a bankrupt party.
Finally, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation protects investors
from their brokers' insolvency.1 50
As indicated above, a new integrated market will result in novel inno-
vations, but will simultaneously be accompanied by a greater number of
failures. Moreover, because of many interrelated causes, including risk-
ier ventures, uncertainty, volatile exchange rates, and unprecedented op-
portunities to engage in illegal trading, the high number of bankruptcies
can be expected to continue into the future. 5 '
United States investors of insolvent companies often react to a declara-
tion of bankruptcy by claiming there was a material error in either dis-
closure or omission which induced the investment and, hence, their loss.
Absent the enactment of uniform regulations of securities traded world-
wide, an event which is unlikely to occur,15 2 transnational companies will
continue to commit fraud (as defined by the United States). United
States investors of these companies will likely respond to a declaration of
bankruptcy by claiming violations of Rule lOb-5. Therefore, the likeli-
hood of a Rule lOb-5 action arising in the context of a transnational
bankruptcy case has risen dramatically.
This prospect is problematic because the emerging trend for applying
United States laws extraterritorially in transnational securities fraud
cases directly opposes the emerging trend for applying United States laws
in transnational bankruptcy cases. 5a While United States courts have
continued to extend extraterritorial application of Rule lOb-5, 5 4 they
148. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1993).
149. See Bernard, supra note 137, at 325.
150. See id.
151. This trend coincides with the recent abrupt end of a decade of rapid development.
During the 1980s, remarkable advances occurred in the area of international finance. For
example, investment multiplied significantly, in part through investors' willingness to
over-leverage. In addition, the 1980s were marked by an unprecedented number of merg-
ers and acquisitions, and there appeared to be an endless supply of money.
Yet, the current downturn in the economy has had a chilling effect on the advances of
the 1980s, and the consequences of this downturn are now being realized. Moreover, this
decade of international prosperity culminated in "[t]he B.C.C.I. scandal, [which] high-
lighted, and left unresolved the 'least common denominator aspect' of international fi-
nance-that is, money flows to the places that regulate least." Lohr, supra note 135, at
28-32 (quoting E. Gerald Corrigan, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
and head of The Bank of International Settlement's committee on global banking supervi-
sion in Basel, Switzerland, testifying before the House Banking Committee last fall).
152. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
153. See supra part I.
154. See supra part I. A.
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have restricted the extraterritorial application of United States bank-
ruptcy laws.' In fact, these two trends are headed on a collision course.
Thus, an issue of critical concern is which approach courts should apply
when faced with this situation.
IMl. DOMESTIC PUBLIC POLICY SHOULD PROVOKE APPLICATION OF
ExTRATERRrroRIAL DOCTRINE WHEN RULE lOb-5 ARISES IN AN
INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING
Part I of this Note discussed the willingness of the United States courts
to apply United States securities laws expansively to extraterritorial dis-
putes.'56 The United States courts have been overwhelmingly receptive
toward plaintiffs claiming violations of Rule lOb-5, and have often pre-
mised application of United States securities laws on minimal contacts
with the United States.' 57 For example, when United States shareholders
of foreign corporations allege Rule lOb-5 violations, United States courts
traditionally exercise considerable discretion in asserting subject matter
jurisdiction and in applying United States securities laws, even where the
defendant does not necessarily intend to link the fraud to the United
States.' 58
As stated in Part I of this Note, the United States courts have been
reluctant to apply United States bankruptcy laws to extraterritorial dis-
putes.' 59 The courts have been disinclined to adjudicate claims brought
against foreign debtors, even when deferring to foreign bankruptcy pro-
ceedings will leave a United States creditor with less protection than the
United States Bankruptcy Code would afford."6 A conflict thus arises
when a shareholder alleges securities fraud claims against an interna-
tional corporation which is concurrently undergoing foreign bankruptcy
proceedings. The question that arises is whether the United States courts
should assert jurisdiction and adjudicate the Rule lOb-5 claims or, alter-
natively, dismiss the action in deference to the related foreign bankruptcy
proceedings.
The recurrence of this conflict is an inevitable byproduct of globaliza-
tion. The increasing number of multinational corporations, and the
155. See supra part I. B.
156. See supra part I. A.
157. See supra part I. A.
158. See, e-g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 980 (2d Cir.) (defendant
Investors Bank Limited of Nassau, the Bahamas, issued a prospectus which specifically
stated that the shares being offered "are not being offered in the United States of America
... or any area subject to its jurisdiction"), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
159. See supra part I. B.
160. See, eg., In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 130 B.R. 705, 713-14 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that creditor holding secured claim under New York law and
United States Bankruptcy Code, but relegated to status of unsecured creditor under Swiss
law, could not preclude turnover of assets to Swiss bankruptcy proceeding; the test is
whether proceedings in the foreign country comport with fundamental notions of fair-
ness, not whether Swiss law mirrors American law), vacated on other grounds, 961 F.2d
341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 188 (1992).
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question of their relationships "to the home and the host nation,"1 61 have
raised several issues concerning both the external activities of these cor-
porations and the reach of the regulatory authority of the various nations
involved in areas such as antitrust, anti-corruption, bankruptcy, environ-
mental protection, foreign exchange, labor, securities regulation, and
tax.'6 2 The doctrine of extraterritoriality has developed independently
within each area of substantive law. Accordingly, the doctrine applied in
securities law is contrary to that applied in bankruptcy proceedings. Re-
gardless of whether this is a positive'6 3 or negative' 64 circumstance that
the extraterritorial doctrine accounts for the substantive law, in practi-
cality, it is inevitable. A broad, overgeneralized rule would result in nu-
merous exceptions, thus rendering any such rule ineffective.
The recent insolvency proceedings of Polly Peck International 16' ex-
emplify the need for a uniform approach to this dilemma. Polly Peck is a
publicly held, multinational conglomerate organized under the laws of
the United Kingdom. The company is currently undergoing reorganiza-
tion 166 pursuant to an administration order issued by an English court. 16'
This administration order has triggered a stay on the commencement or
continuation of all judicial and other proceedings against Polly Peck and
its property.' 68 In the midst of this complex administration, a share-
holder, Nathan Zeidenberg, 169 filed suit in the United States against
Polly Peck claiming violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Rule 10b-5, and common law fraud. Polly Peck contended that an effec-
tive defense of this action would have required the administrators to ex-
pend an immense amount of time and incur tremendous costs. Thus, it
161. P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 Duke L. J. 1, 93.
162. See id. at 93-94.
163. See, eg., Bruce A. Rosenfeld, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Laws: A Con-
flict of Laws Approach, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 1005, 1028 (1976) (arguing that the ad hoc
approach is more likely to serve justice between the parties in each case).
164. See, e.g., Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1310, 1318-19 (1985) (referring to the divergence
among the tests, the author comments: "Given the muddle of current doctrine, it is
hardly surprising that courts have decided questions of extraterritoriality in an inconsis-
tent and confusing fashion.").
165. See In re Polly Peck Int'l PlC, No. 009296 of 1990 in the High Court of Justice,
Chancery Division, Companies Court, Order dated October 25, 1990.
166. The Polly Peck insolvency proceedings are estimated to be the largest in the his-
tory of the United Kingdom. Polly Peck has approximately 2000 creditors (not including
shareholders), with claims currently amounting to approximately $2.3 billion. See
Zeidenberg v. Polly Peck, No. 91 Civ. 3246, 1992 WL 178626 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1992).
167. Specifically, the Companies Court of England and Wales in the Chancery Divi-
sion of the High Court of Justice issued the order.
168. This stay is similar to the automatic stay triggered by the filing of a Chapter 11
petition under the United States Bankruptcy Code.
169. Plaintiff purports to represent a class of purchasers of Polly Peck Ordinary Stock,
or American Depositary Receipts, who acquired their securities in the United States be-
tween January 2, 1989, and October 16, 1990. However, plaintiff has made no motion to
obtain class certification.
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made a motion to dismiss the suit on the grounds of comity and forum
non conveniens.
The Southern District of New York, in dismissing both Zeidenberg's
suit and a second securities fraud suit against Polly Peck,"'0 concluded
that the comity regularly accorded to bankruptcy proceedings in com-
mon law jurisdictions abroad supported dismissal of the two claims.""
The court asserted that the procedures under the United Kingdom Insol-
vency Act, although not identical, are comparable to those under the
United States Bankruptcy Code in that they abide by standards of funda-
mental fairness. 172 The court's conclusion, however, was based upon an
erroneous interpretation of the Third Circuit's holding in Kohn v. Ameri-
can Metal Climax, Ina 171
In Kohn, American shareholders of a Zambian mining corporation
claimed that the corporation obtained shareholder approval of a pro-
posed amalgamation by violating United States securities laws. The
Third Circuit ruled that the fairness of the corporate amalgamation
could not be challenged in the United States because it had already been
decided by a Zambian court. 174 On the other hand, the court distin-
guished the Rule lOb-5 claim 175 and held that it could properly be heard
by the district court.1 76 Consequently, the American shareholders were
entitled to bring the Rule lOb-5 action notwithstanding the Third Cir-
cuit's decision to defer to the foreign bankruptcy proceedings.
The court in Zeidenberg relied upon Kohn in concluding that "defer-
ence may be given to foreign bankruptcy proceedings where the Ameri-
can suit is based on United States securities laws."' 7 Although this
interpretation of Kohn is accurate, it does not support the dismissal of
the Rule 10b-5 claims against Polly Peck. The shareholders in Kohn
were entitled, nonetheless, to bring their Rule lOb-5 claims. In fact, the
Third Circuit concluded that it was obligated to provide the shareholders
with a remedy.1 78 Therefore, the Southern District of New York errone-
170. See Lindner Fund, Inc. v. Polly Peck Int'l PLC, 143 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
In Lindner Fund, plaintiff alleged violations of §§ 18 and 27 of the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act, and negligence.
171. See Suits Against U.K. Bankrupt Firm Dismissed Based on Comity Principles, 24
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1418 (Aug. 28, 1992).
172. See Zeidenberg v. Polly Peck, No. 91 Civ. 3246, 1992 WL 178626, at 13
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1992).
173. 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
174. See id, at 269-70.
175. The plaintiff Kohn, as trustee of American Depositary Receipts, filed a derivative
action claiming that the explanatory statements and appendices mailed to the sharehold-
ers, along with the proxy materials, were materially misleading.
176. See Kohn, 458 F.2d at 270 ("ITihe [district court] findings [as to violations of
Rule 10b-5] go to the adequacy of the disclosure. . . (and] may have influenced the
stockholder vote regardless of the fairness of the amalgamation. In those circumstances
we think the court is obligated to provide a remedy.").
177. Zeidenberg v. Polly Peck, No. 91 Civ. 3246, 1992 WL 178626, at 03 (S.D.N.Y.
July 16, 1992) (citing Kohn, 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cerL denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972)).
178. See Kohn, 458 F.2d at 270.
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ously relied upon Kohn to dismiss the Rule lOb-5 claims brought against
Polly Peck.
A number of cases decided subsequent to Kohn have found that while
comity may be applicable to securities claims, "the [Kohn] opinion re-
flects a legitimate concern that claimants asserting federally protected
rights not be made to depend on the vagaries of another country's law'
which might not protect them as fully as our own."179 In fact, in Pogos-
tin v. Pato Consolidated Gold Dredging, Ltd., °80 a New York court,
which relied principally on Kohn, similarly found an obligation to pro-
vide a remedy for a plaintiff who has proven violations of the United
States securities laws, even when a foreign defendant is the party who
violated the laws.1" The New York court reasoned that "[o]therwise the
Congressional policy implicit in federal securities regulation in this coun-
try would be seriously frustrated." ' 2
The policy argument asserted in Kohn and Pogostin has been applied
to foreign conflicts of law in other substantive areas."8 3 For example,
courts have held that some areas of law--e.g., those areas which present
universal goals-may be treated with substantial consistency, regardless
of the nation imposing regulations. Consistent with this premise is the
assertion that "the lack of a shared goal does not [automatically] imply
the existence of an opposing goal"; 84 often, cognizable foreign interests
are not harmed by the United States imposing more stringent regulations
than those enacted by the foreign jurisdiction. Certain aspects of foreign
laws, however, are designed in a manner which prevent implementation
179. DeYoung v. Beddome, 707 F. Supp. 132, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing Pogostin v.
Pato Consolidated Gold Dredging, Ltd., [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,922, at 90,699, reargument granted and rev'd in part, 98,012, at 91,237 (S.D.N.Y.
1981)). Although the appellate court in Kohn partially reversed the lower court, it ac-
cepted the lower court's finding that
United States Courts have exclusive jurisdiction under the Securities Exchange
Act and defendants [had] not asserted that any similar law exists in Zambia.
Accordingly, no finding, especially one that is merely implicit in the High
Court's finding of fairness, could bind this Court, at least as to plaintiffs' Securi-
ties Exchange Act claims.
Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modi-
fied in part, 458 F.2d 255 (3rd Cir. 1972).
180. [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,922, reargument granted
and rev'd in part, 198,012 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (dismissing complaint on the grounds that the
Bermuda Court had previously approved the adequacy of disclosure).
181. See id. at 90,699 (shareholder of a Bermuda corporation claimed the corporation
violated United States securities laws by freezing-out public shareholders of the corpora-
tion at an unfair price).
182. Kohn, 458 F.2d 255, 270 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
183. See, e.g., Michael P. Bigelow, Case Comment, Public Policy Concerns Prevent Ap-
plication of Comity to Foreign Bankruptcy Proceedings that Discriminate Against Tax Ob-
ligations Owed to the United States Government, 24 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 571, 585 (1991)
(arguing that a public policy approach is most appropriate to uphold strong public policy
regarding tax obligations). Public policy has also been an issue of concern in litigation
involving antitrust concerns and pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
184. Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1259, 1306 (1986).
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of United States goals."8 5 In these areas, courts should focus more heav-
ily on United States public policy.
Recent antitrust cases concerning conflicting foreign laws clearly
demonstrate the need to analyze United States public policy."8 6 In addi-
tion, many commentators agree that a public policy approach to choice
of law questions is more appropriate than an international comity ap-
proach. These commentators have questioned whether the courts are
competent to balance international interests effectively, 8 7 and whether a
court may rely upon principles of international comity to dismiss, for
lack of jurisdiction, an otherwise congressionally authorized cause of
action. 188
One case, for example, which addressed these concerns is Laker Air-
ways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines.'"9 In Laker, the D.C. Cir-
cuit acknowledged that courts are ill-equipped to engage in balancing
foreign and domestic interests, and that any such attempt would, there-
fore, be inappropriate. According to the Laker court, a balancing ap-
proach was deficient for several reasons. First, in most cases, a court has
already evaluated many of the factors set forth in a balancing test during
its initial determination of prescriptive jurisdiction. t ° Second, the con-
tacts which "provide a basis for distinguishing between competing bases
185. See eg., id at 1299 (asserting that foreign antitrust laws "may be designed pre-
cisely to prevent implementation of... United States [antitrust] law[s]").
186. Pursuant to Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976), early antitrust cases applied a balancing test in granting extraterritorial effect to
antitrust laws. However, this balancing test was not uniform throughout the courts.
Compare Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614 (proposing seven-factor test) and Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleun Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979) (proposing 10-
factor test) with Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (challenging the usefulness of a balancing approach). However, more
recent cases suggest that "[t]he U.S. judiciary seeks foremost to protect the marketplace
by effectively enforcing American antitrust policies." James M. Grippando, Declining to
Exercise Extraterritorial Antitrust Jurisdiction on Grounds of International Comity: An
Illegitimate Extension of the Judicial Abstention Doctrine, 23 Va. J. Int'l L., 395, 396
(1983).
187. See, eg., M. Sornarajah, The Extraterritorial Enforcement of US. Antitrust Lan"
Conflict and Compromise, 31 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 127, 148 (1982) (arguing that judges
may not be competent to balance foreign relations factors); J.S. Stanford, The Application
of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States A View from Abroad, 11 Cornell
Int'l L.J. 195, 205 (1978) (discussing foreign governments' distrust of U.S. courts).
188. See, e.g., James A. Rahl, International Application of American Antitrust La w
Issues and Proposals, 2 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 336, 363 (1980) (suggesting that courts may
lack the legitimate power to decline to exercise jurisdiction absent congressional ap-
proval); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Antitrust, Interest Analysis, and the New Conflict of Laws,
95 Harv. L. Rev. 1976, 1979 (1982) (reviewing James R. Atwood & Kingman Brewster,
Antitrust and American Business Abroad (2d ed. 1981)) (suggesting that framing the
question of extraterritorial antitrust enforcement as one of jurisdiction is inappropriate
because jurisdiction exists when connection with the United States is shown and "any
decision not to 'exercise jurisdiction' is ... a matter of grace, of diplomacy, or of wisdom
.. but not one of law").
189. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
190. See id at 948.
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ofjurisdiction... generally incorporate purely political factors which the
court is neither qualified to evaluate comparatively nor capable of prop-
erly balancing." '' The Laker court thus conceded that it was "ill-
equipped to 'balance the vital national interests of the United States and
[a foreign government] to determine which interests predominate.' "192
However, the Laker court further concluded that "[a]n... American
court cannot refuse to enforce a law its political branches have already
determined is desirable and necessary." '193 Specifically, the Laker court
was referring to antitrust laws. Many commentators have concluded
that the availability of treble damages demonstrates the firm opposition
to monopolistic practices in the United States. Because such behavior
may be overlooked, or even actively encouraged, by foreign governments,
the court was concerned that declining to assert extraterritorial antitrust
jurisdiction on grounds of international comity, would likely leave a
plaintiff without an adequate remedy.' 94 To preclude such an unfair re-
sult, United States courts adjudicating international antitrust cases often
allow domestic public policy concerns to override international comity.
Similar to the antitrust laws, the United States securities laws provide
numerous alternatives for pursuing securities fraud claims, including the
opportunity for a plaintiff to impose multiple damages.' 95 This availabil-
ity demonstrates that, in this country, opposition to securities fraud is
comparable with opposition to monopolistic practices. Moreover, such
behavior may also be overlooked, or even actively encouraged, by foreign
governments. Thus, United States courts adjudicating securities fraud
claims that are brought within the context of an international bankruptcy
case should follow the lead established in the antitrust arena.
Some critics maintain that such a policy is unnecessary because no
country would sanction securities fraud.196 Yet, blocking and secrecy
191. Id. at 949. These factors include "the degree to which the desirability of such
regulation ... is generally accepted," "the existence ofjustified expectations that might be
protected or hurt by the regulation in question," and "'the importance of regulation to
the regulating state.'" Id. (citation omitted).
192. Id. at 950 (quoting In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D.
Ill. 1979)). The applicable time constraints also placed an inherent limitation on the
court's ability to balance competing interests. See id.
Although the Laker opinion concerned extraterritorial application of United States
antitrust laws, the same arguments are applicable in the context of United States securi-
ties laws. The United States has imposed stringent legislation in both of these substantive
areas of law, thereby revealing strong public sentiment.
193. 731 F.2d 909, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasis omitted). "Although the flash
point of the controversy has been the antisuit injunctions, the real powder keg is the
strongly mandated legislative policies which each national court is bound to implement."
Id. at 916.
194. See Grippando, supra note 186, at 420.
195. See, e.g., Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat.
1264 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
196. See Stewart, supra note 184, at 1305; see also IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 921
(2d Cir. 1980):
The problem of conflict between our laws and that of a foreign government is
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laws do appear to have this effect. Furthermore, the term "securities
fraud" has not been defined uniformly across international borders; each
country defines its own standards under which activities are deemed
either permissible or fraudulent. Thus, in light of these problems and the
inadequate remedies currently provided by foreign nations in the adjudi-
cation of securities fraud actions, United States courts should focus on
the strong public policy embodied in the United States securities laws,
rather than resort to international comity.
CONCLUSION
In transnational securities fraud cases, United States courts have found
an overwhelming need to apply United States law. Responding to this
need, the courts have grasped to find even the most minimal links neces-
sary to derive authority for applying United States law. Yet, in transna-
tional bankruptcy cases, United States courts have been overwhelmingly
receptive toward applying foreign law. One question that arises as a re-
sult of changes in today's global market is how the courts will handle
securities fraud claims that arise in the context of a transnational
bankruptcy.
The United States securities laws reflect a firm opposition in the
United States toward fraudulent practices. Rule 10b-5 was designed to
protect investors by preventing such behavior. To realize this goal fully,
and because of the inadequacy of comparable foreign laws, United States
courts should adopt a protectionist treatment and apply United States
securities laws, regardless of whether the lOb-5 fraud claim arises in a
transnational bankruptcy.
much less when the issue is the enforcement of the anti-fraud sections of the
securities laws than with such provisions as those requiring registration of per-
sons or securities. The primary interest of Luxembourg is in the righting of a
wrong done to an entity created by it. If our anti-fraud laws are stricter than
Luxembourg's, that country will surely not be offended by their application. If
they are weaker .... the [plaintiffs] made their choice, doubtless at least in part
because of difficulty in securing personal jurisdiction in Luxembourg .... ;
Edward A. Taylor, Note, Expanding the Jurisdictional Basis for Transnational Securities
Fraud Cases: A Minimal Conduct Approach, 6 Fordham Int'l L.J. 308, 328 (1983) (as-
serting that extraterritorial application of antifraud provisions is less offensive to foreign
countries than extraterritorial application of registration and margin requirements be-
cause antifraud provisions do not interfere with foreign economic policies).
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